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The discount rate in the economic evaluation of
prevention: a thought experiment
L Bonneux, E Birnie
Abstract
Objectives—In the standard economic
model of evaluation, constant discount
rates devalue the long term health benefits
of prevention strongly. This study shows
that it is unlikely that this reflects societal
preference.
Design—A thought experiment in a cause
elimination life table calculates savings of
eliminating cardiovascular disease from
the Dutch population. A cost eVectiveness
analysis calculates the acceptable costs of
such an intervention at a threshold of
18 000 Euro per saved life year.
Methods—Cause specific mortality (all
cardiovascular causes of death and all
other causes) and health care costs (all
costs of cardiovascular disease and all
other causes of costs) by age and male sex
of 1994.
Results—At a 0% discount rate, an inter-
vention eliminating cardiovascular dis-
ease may cost 71 100 Euro. At the same
threshold but at discount rates of 3% or
6%, the same intervention may cost 8100
Euro (8.8 times less) or 1100 Euro (65
times less).
Conclusions—The standard economic
model needs more realistic duration de-
pendent models of time preference, which
reflect societal preference.
(J Epidemiol Community Health 2001;55:123–125)
Discounting in economic evaluation implies
that costs and benefits occurring at diVerent
points in time are valued diVerently. Weinstein
and Stason proposed the problem as follows:
take a programme with identical costs now, but
programme A yields one year of life now, and
programme B will yield one year of life within
40 year.1 Few will doubt what programme
policy makers will choose. In general we prefer
to pay as late as possible, and to enjoy the ben-
efits as soon as possible. In the standard model
of economic evaluation of health interventions,
a simple exponential model is recommended to
represent this time preference: the discount
rate.2 Values in the future are devalued by a
constant annual percentage, equal for costs and
eVects. That means that at a discount rate of
5% health eVects are devalued in year 1 by 5%,
in year 10 by 40%, in year 20 by 65% in year 30
by 80%, and so on. The further away costs and
eVects in the future, the more they will be dis-
counted and the less they are valued now.
In the standard model of economic evalua-
tion, discount rates for costs and health eVects
have to be equal for various reasons.1 3–6 Apply-
ing discount rates for the rise in consumption
in real terms, something of 5% to costs and
eVects, makes nearly all prevention pro-
grammes aiming at long term benefits very cost
ineVective.7 We demonstrate by a thought
experiment that it is highly unlikely that the
constant discount rate reflects societal prefer-
ence.
Methods and Results
A thought experiment is a device of the imagi-
nation, an experiment that can achieve its aims
without being executed. Its aim is to create an
anomaly in the reigning theory.8 In this thought
experiment, we radically eliminate cardiovas-
cular disease as cause of death and as cause of
health care costs, in a hypothetical cohort of
new borns. We then recalculate life expectan-
cies and health care costs at various discount
rates as if cardiovascular disease never existed.
Because cardiovascular disease is prevalent in
old age, any change in discount rate has
tremendous consequences.
We use a cause elimination life table with two
causes of death and two sources of costs
(cardiovascular diseases and all other causes of
health care costs and deaths). The methods
have been presented previously in more detail.9
The life table is interpreted as a cohort, and is
based on the mortality of all causes and of all
cardiovascular causes (ICD-9 codes 390–440)
of Dutch men (1990–94). Medical costs of
cardiovascular diseases and of all other causes
than cardiovascular disease are taken from the
Cost of Illness Study of 1994.10 We assume that
an intervention eliminates all cardiovascular
diseases, both as a source of costs and as a
cause of death. Discounting is appropriate
Table 1 Life expectancy at birth (E0), life time cost expectancy (CE0), and both expectancies after elimination of
cardiovascular diseases (E-0; CE-0).ÄE0 and ÄCE0 show the life time savings in life years and Euro (if negative, these are
costs) after elimination of cardiovascular disease. At 18 000 Euro per saved and discounted life year, the acceptable cost of
an intervention at birth is 18000 × ÄE0 + ÄCE0 Euro
Discount rate E0 CE0 E-0 CE-0 ÄE0 ÄCE0 Acceptable costs
0% 74.15 124000 78.89 138000 4.74 −14000 71100
3% 29.31 32600 29.76 32700 0.45 −100 8100
6% 16.25 15300 16.30 15100 0.05 200 1100
10% 9.879 9230 9.883 9170 0.004 60 130
Values are rounded.






Dr Bonneux, Department of
Public Health, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, PO






 on 28 November 2006 jech.bmj.comDownloaded from 
because in a cohort age and time are
equivalent. In the Netherlands, 18 000 Euro
per saved discounted life year is considered an
acceptable price for prevention programmes.11
The acceptable costs of an elimination pro-
gramme at time 0 are then equal or less than
(18 000 Euro × saved life years + saved costs).
The saved costs are the result of the savings,
caused by the eradication of cardiovascular
disease and the costs, caused by life extension.
Table 1 lists the main results. Male life
expectancy (E0) in 1990–94 was 74.2 years.
The undiscounted costs of the life table cohort
subjected to the mortality risks of 1990–94 and
the health care costs of 1994 (the lifetime
expected costs at birth, CE0) are 124 000 Euro.
After elimination of cardiovascular mortality,
life expectancy increased by nearly five years
and costs increased by 14 000 Euro. The costs
generated by life extension are higher than the
costs saved by elimination of cardiovascular
disease.9 10 However, because nearly five life
years are saved, these costs of life extension are
rather trivial: elimination of cardiovascular dis-
ease may cost more than 71 000 Euro, and still
be considered cost eVective.
Discounting at even small rates changes
these estimates tremendously. At 3%, the
discounted life expectancy decreases by 60%
or 45 years, and the discounted cost expect-
ancy decreases even by 74% or 90 000 Euro.
The discounted costs of life extension disap-
pear, but the discounted benefits decrease by
90%. The acceptable price of elimination
decreases ninefold from 71 000 Euro to 8100
Euro. At 6%, the acceptable prices decrease
70-fold (1100 Euro). Figures 1 and 2 show
graphically the results from table 1. Health
gains and the costs of life extension are many
years away in the future of the birth cohort, and
will disappear almost completely after dis-
counting.
Discussion
The use of discount rates implies that we
strongly devalue the benefits of any preventive
activity implemented at youth or adult age and
aimed at degenerative diseases. Indeed, at a
discount rate of 6% a vaccination that would
save us eternally from all cardiovascular
diseases would not be considered worthwhile at
expenses over 1100 Euro, the price of a better
colour television set or hi-fi set. We think that
few people would agree.
It is not the rationale of discounting that is to
be doubted. In medicine, there are many prac-
tical examples of the hypothetical case as
presented by Weinstein and Stason.1 Compare
for example vaccination against hepatitis B and
treatment of hepatitis B patients. Assume that
by vaccinating against hepatitis B we must
forego treatment of patients with chronic
hepatitis B, or vice versa. Then, the adequate
weighing of future disability is of crucial
importance. Using zero % discount rates
Figure 1 Life years saved by age (ÄLx) after elimination
of cardiovascular mortality at birth, at discount rates of














Figure 2 Changes in health care costs (ÄCostx) by age
after elimination of cardiovascular disexase at birth, both as


















+ If resources are scarce, trade oVs have to
be made between investing in the care of
existing disease and in the prevention of
future disease.
+ In the standard model of economic
evaluation, costs and health eVects are
devalued by a constant discount rate.
+ The utility of eliminating all cardiovas-
cular diseases in a cohort of new borns is
excessively dependent of the constant
discount rate used.
+ Economic evaluation of prevention needs
a more realistic model of time preference
that reflects societal preferences.
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implies that we value the disease within 20 or
more years equal to existing disease now. This
is contrary to “the law of cure”. Only if the
future health benefits of vaccination outweigh
by far the actual health benefits of treatment
can we accept to forego treating hepatitis B.
The aging of the population will coincide with
the boom in preventive health care technology,
driven by the increasing knowledge about the
genetic basis of many diseases. Choices be-
tween care, cure and prevention will be inevita-
ble.
The problem is the constant monotonous
discount rate in the standard model of
economic evaluation. This constant rate is
responsible for the strong dependence of future
values of the future time horizon. Empirical
studies about time preference are relatively
rare, small, limited to selected populations and
beset by low response rates (probably a conse-
quence of the high level of abstraction of the
questions asked). None of these show any
empirical support for the monotonous con-
stant discount rates.12 On the contrary, ob-
served discount rates depend on the length of
the time horizon proposed.12–14
Value judgements over time are neither
objective measures, nor are they obvious results
of an irrefutable theory. But neither are they
arbitrary. People are clearly willing to invest in
their health during their life course. Parents are
even more eager to invest in the future health of
their children. This makes little sense if they
would devalue health over time at an eternally
negative compound interest. But resources are
constrained and opportunity costs are attached
to these investments. To guide people and
policy makers in their choices about the values
of prevention we need better empirical esti-
mates of time preferences, and more realistic
time dependent models of discounting that
reflects these.
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